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A conceit is afflicting the liberal left.  The once reflexive adjustments of civilizational 
logics, suspicions about theories of universal progress, and the disposition to challenge 
the Washington consensus on social, economic, and political affairs is now undergoing a 
steady reversal.  A universalist liberal ideology has been re-asserted. It is not only neo-con 
hawks or Blairite opportunists that now legitimise wars for democracy.  Alarmingly, it is a 
generation of political thinkers who opposed the Nixonian logic of war (wars to show that a 
country can ‘credibly’ fight a war to protect its interests1), and those humbled by the anti-
colonial struggles of liberation from previous incarnations of European superiority that are 
renewing spurious civilizational discourses.  This ‘muscular liberalism’ has found its voice 
at the moment of a global political debate about the legality and effectiveness of ‘just wars’ 
– so called ‘wars for democracy’ or ‘humanitarian war’.   
The new political alignment of the liberal left emerged in the context of discussions 
about the ‘use of force’ irrespective of UN Security Council endorsement or the sovereign 
state’s territorial integrity, such as in Kosovo – but gained rapid momentum in response to 
attacks in New York City and Washington on September 11, 2001.  Parts of the liberal left 
have now aligned themselves with neoconservative foreign policies, and have joined what 
they believe is a new anti-totalitarian global struggle – the ‘war on terror’ or the battle 
against Islamist fundamentalism. One task of this essay, then, is to identify this new 
formation of the liberal left.  
Much horror and suffering has been unleashed on the world in the name of the 
liberal society which must endure.  However, when suicide bombing and state-terror are 
compared, the retort is that there is no moral equivalence between the two.  Talal Asad in 
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his evocative book, On Suicide Bombing, has probed the horror that is felt about suicide 
bombing in contrast to state violence and terror.2  What affective associations are formed 
in the reaction to suicide bombing? What does horror about suicide bombing tell us about 
the constitution of inter-subjective relations? In this essay I begin to probe these questions 
about the relation between death, subjectivity, and politics.  I want to excavate below the 
surface oppositions of good deaths and bad, justifiable killing and barbarism, which have 
been so central to left liberal arguments.  As so much is riding on the difference between 
‘our good war’ and ‘their cult of death’, it seems apt to examine and undo the opposition. 
The muscular liberal left projects itself as embodying the values of the ‘West’, a 
geo-political convergence that is regularly opposed to the ‘East’, ‘Muslims’, or the ‘Islamic 
World’. I undo this opposition, arguing that thanatopolitics, a convergence of death, 
sacrifice, martyrdom and politics, is common to left liberal and Islamist political formations. 
How does death become political for left liberals and Islamist suicide bombers?  In the 
case of the latter, what is most immediately apparent is how little is known about the 
politics and politicization of suicide bombers.  Suicide bombers are represented as a near 
perfect contrast to the free, autonomous, self-legislating liberal subject – a person over-
determined by her backward culture, oppressive setting, and yet also empty of content, 
and whose death can have no temporal political purchase.   The ‘suicide bomber’ tends to 
be treated by the liberal left as a trans-historical ‘figure’, usually represented as the 
‘Islamo-fascist’ or the ‘irrational’ Muslim.3  The causes of suicide bombing are often 
implicitly placed on Islam itself – a religion that is represented as devoid of ‘scepticism, 
doubt, or rebellion’ and thus seen as a favourable setting for totalitarianism.4  The account 
of the suicide bomber as neo-fascist assassin supplements a lack – that is, that the 
association of suicide bombing with Islam explains very little.  The suicide bomber is thus 
made completely familiar as totalitarian fascist, or wholly other as “[a] completely new kind 
of enemy, one for whom death is not death”.5 So much that is written about the suicide 
bomber glosses over the unknown with political subjectivities, figures, and paradigms 
(such as fascism) which are familiar enough to be vociferously opposed. By drawing the 
suicide bomber into a familiar moral register of ‘evil’, political and historical relations 
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between victim and perpetrator are erased.6  In the place of ethnographically informed 
research the ‘theorist’ or ‘public intellectual’ erases the contingency of the suicide bomber 
and reduces her death to pure annihilation, or nothingness. 
The discussion concludes by undoing the notion of the ‘West’, the very ground that 
the liberal left assert they stand for. The ‘West’ is no longer a viable representation of a 
geo-political convergence, if it ever was.  Liberal discourse has regarded itself as the 
projection of the ‘West’ and its enlightenment.  But this ignores important continuities 
between Islam, Christianity, and contemporary secular formations.  The current ‘clash of 
monotheisms’, I argue after J-L Nancy, reveals a crisis of sense, authority, and meaning 
which is inherent to the monotheistic form.  An increasingly globalised world is made up of 
political communities and juridical orders that have been ‘emptied’ of authority and 
certainty. This crisis of sense conditions the horror felt by the supposedly rational liberal in 
the face of Islamist terrorism.  Horror at terrorism is then the affective bond that sustains a 
grouping that otherwise suffers the loss of a political project with a definite end.    
The general objective of this essay is to challenge the unexamined assumptions 
about politics and death that circulate in liberal left denunciations of Islamic fascism.  The 
horror and fascination with the figure of the suicide bomber reveals an unacknowledged 
affective bond that constitutes the muscular liberal left as a political formation.  This relies 
on disavowing the sacrificial and theological underpinnings of political liberalism itself – 
and ignores the continuities between what is called the ‘West’ and the theologico-political 
enterprise of monotheism.  Monotheism is not the preserve of something called the ‘West’, 
but rather an enterprise that is common to all three Religions of the Book.  The article 
concludes by describing how the writings of Jean-Luc Nancy on monotheism offer liberal 
left thinkers insights for rethinking the crisis of value that resulted from the collapse of 
grand emancipatory enterprises as well as the fragmentation of politics resulting from a 
focus on political identification through difference.  
 
I The Liberal Left 
I opened with a reference to the ‘liberal left’.  Of course the ‘liberal left’ signifies a 
vast and varied range of political thinking and activism – so I must clarify how I am 
deploying this term.  In this essay the terms ‘liberal left’ or ‘muscular liberal’ are used inter-
changeably.  Paul Berman and Nick Cohen, whose writing I will shortly refer to, are 
exemplars of the new political alignment who self-identify as ‘democrats and progressives’, 
but whose writings feature bellicose assertions about the superiority of western models of 
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democracy, and universal human rights.7  Among this liberal left, democracy and freedom 
become hemispheric and come to stand for the West.  
More generally, now, the ‘liberal left’ can be distinguished from political movements 
and thinkers who draw inspiration from a Marxist tradition of thought with a socialist 
horizon. The liberal left I am referring to would view the Marxist tradition as undervaluing 
democratic freedoms and human rights.  Left liberals also tend to dismiss the so called 
post-Marxist turn in European continental philosophy as ‘postmodern relativism’.8 Post-
Marxists confronted the problem of the ‘collective’ – addressing the problem of masses 
and classes as the universal category or agent of historical transformation.  This was a 
necessary correction to all the disasters visited on the masses in the name of a universal 
working class. The liberal state exploited these divisions on the left. It is true that a left 
fragmented through identity politics or the politics of difference were reduced to group 
based claims on the state. However, liberal multiculturalism was critiqued by anti-racist 
and feminist thinkers as early as the 1970s for ignoring the structural problems of class or 
as yet another nation-building device.  The new formation of the muscular liberal left have 
only just discovered the defects of multiculturalism. The dismissal of liberal 
multiculturalism is now code for ‘too much tolerance’ of ‘all that difference’.  The liberal left, 
or muscular liberal, as I use these terms, should not be conflated with the way ‘liberal’ is 
generally used in North America to denote ‘progressive’, ‘pro-choice’, open to a multiplicity 
of forms of sexual expression, generally ‘tolerant’, or ‘left wing’ (meaning socialist). 
It might be objected that it is not the liberal left, but ‘right wing crazies’ driven by 
Christian evangelical zeal combined with neo-liberal economic strategies that have 
usurped a post-9/11 crime and security agenda to mount a global hegemonic enterprise in 
the name of a ‘war on terror’. It might also be said that this is nothing new – global 
expansionist enterprises such as 18th and 19th century colonialism mobilised religion, 
science, and theories of economic development to secure resources and justify extreme 
                                                 
7
 By the ‘liberal left’ I have in mind a wide group of thinkers – but space prevents me from drawing 
on multiple examples. An attempt at unifying the muscular liberals or new formation of the liberal 
left can be found in the enterprise of the Euston Manifesto 2006 – see: 
http://www.eustonmanifesto.org/ - last accessed on 11th October, 2007. Article 11 of the Manifesto 
gives a flavour of the confluence of forces and ideas that make up what I am calling the liberal left:  
“Drawing the lesson of the disastrous history of left apologetics over the crimes of Stalinism 
and Maoism, as well as more recent exercises in the same vein (some of the reaction to 
the crimes of 9/11, the excuse-making for suicide-terrorism, the disgraceful alliances lately 
set up inside the "anti-war" movement with illiberal theocrats), we reject the notion that 
there are no opponents on the Left. We reject, similarly, the idea that there can be no 
opening to ideas and individuals to our right. Leftists who make common cause with, or 
excuses for, anti-democratic forces should be criticized in clear and forthright terms. 
Conversely, we pay attention to liberal and conservative voices and ideas if they contribute 
to strengthening democratic norms and practices and to the battle for human progress”. 
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violence where necessary. Global domination, it might be argued, has always been a 
thanatopolitical enterprise.  So what’s different now? What is crucial, now, is that the entire 
spectrum of liberalism, including the ‘rational centre’, is engaged in the kind of mindset 
whereby a destructive and deadly war is justified in the name of protecting or establishing 
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.  It might then be retorted that this ‘rational 
centre’ of liberalism have ‘always’ been oriented in this way.  That is partly true, but it is 
worth recalling that the liberal left I have in mind is the generation that came of age with 
opposition to the war in Vietnam, other Indo-Chinese conflagrations, and the undoing of 
empire.  This is a left that observed the Cold War conducted through various ‘hot wars’ in 
Africa, Central and Latin America, and South East Asia and thus at least hoped to build a 
‘new world order’ of international law and multilateralism.  This is a left that was resolved, 
by the 1970s, not to repeat the error of blindly following a scientific discourse that 
promised to produce a utopia – whether this was ‘actually existing socialism’ or the purity 
of ‘blood and soil’.  But now, a deadly politics, a thanatopolitics, is drawn out of a liberal 
horror and struggle against a monolithically drawn enemy called Islamic fundamentalism. 
What is new is that Islam has replaced communism/fascism as the new ‘peril’ against 
which the full spectrum of liberalism is mobilized. 
Islamist terrorism and suicide bombers, a clash between an apparently Islamic ‘cult 
of death’ versus modern secular rationality has come to be a central preoccupation of the 
liberal left.  In the process, as Talal Asad has eloquently pointed out, horror about 
terrorism has come to be revealed as one way in which liberal subjectivity and its relation 
to political community can be interrogated and understood.9  Moreover, the potential for 
liberal principles to be deployed in the service of legitimating a doctrine of pre-emption as 
the ‘new internationalism’ is significant. The first and second Gulf Wars, according to the 
liberal left, are then not wars to secure control over the supply of oil, or regional and global 
hegemony, as others on the left might argue, but anti-fascist, anti-totalitarian wars of 
liberation fought in the name of ‘democracy’.  Backing ‘progressive wars’ for ‘freedom and 
democracy’, those who self-identify as a left which is reasserting liberal democratic 
principles start by asking questions such as: “Are western freedoms only for 
westerners?”.10 In the process, freedom becomes ‘western’, and its enemy an amorphous 
legion behind an unidentifiable line between ‘west’ and the rest (the ‘Muslim world’).  The 
‘war for democracy’ waged against ‘Islamist terrorism’ and Muslim fundamentalism is the 
crucible on which the new alignment of the liberal left is forged. 
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For Paul Berman liberalism as it had developed in Europe and North America 
between the Napoleonic wars and the First World War was a formation that provided 
humanity with a steady and predictable model of progress. Divine sources of authority had 
been undermined, and the strength of liberalism was that multiple spheres of activity such 
as science, politics, religion, and private life were treated as independent of each other.11 
The North Atlantic model of progress, like something akin to the ‘white man’s burden’, was 
exported around the world through colonialism. As Berman puts it, several empires 
“postulated progress as its goal”.12 According to Berman, except for those colonized 
peoples under the yoke of the ‘insane’ Belgians, “a good many people among the 
colonized populations approved of those imperial goals, too”.13  The colonized world 
apparently held out the “keen and touching hope” that history’s promise was not just for 
Europeans and North Americans, but that everyone would “progress into freedom, wealth, 
science and stability”.14  Everyone else, then, was just waiting to catch up with Europe and 
North America. The version of liberalism projected by Berman posits a modernity readily at 
odds, it seems, with anything that might be associated with Islamism.  It is precisely this 
distinction between Islamism and modernity that I will break down in the following section 
of this essay. 
What crushed the hope of this march of liberal progress, according Berman, was 
the emergence of two forms of cultish behaviour in the 20th century – communism and 
fascism. Adopting Lenin’s phrase about social movements of a “new type”, asserting 
continuities and parallels between Bolshevism and various national formations of fascism 
– Italian, Spanish and German – Berman draws an uneasy parallel between the deathly 
totalitarianisms of the 1930s and 1940s, and the emergence of movements in the Middle 
East which adopt ideologies of purity, pledge allegiance to a Leader, and adopt the 
powerful myth of a ‘people of God under attack’ (which, for Berman, seems as fitting when 
describing the ‘Russian masses’, as Mussolini’s ‘children of the Roman wolf’15).  All that is 
needed, then, is an Islamist figure to add to Berman’s line-up of Supermen: Lenin, 
Mussolini, Stalin, Hitler – and now, Sayyid Qutb of the Islamic Brotherhood.16 
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It might be objected that I am misusing the term ‘liberal left’ when I include Berman 
as one of their number. The objection comes from a desire, indeed and anxiety, that the 
conjunction of liberal and left should not be surrendered to the likes of Berman.  But surely 
that’s a symptom of the narrowing of what left politics could potentially mean.  There is a 
specifically North American tendency to preserve the ‘liberal left’ as a tag for ‘as radical as 
one can be’.  In France one can still ‘respectably’ be a socialist; in India or Italy one can be 
a Communist and still be ‘mainstream’, and not dismissed as part of the ‘lunatic fringe’. In 
North America, ‘liberal left’ has signified being progressive, identifying with the poor and 
marginalised, feminist, pro-choice, LGBT-friendly, and backing state intervention in the 
management and regulation of the economy.  What happens when this political positioning 
has to confront its ‘enemy’ - precisely the question that Carl Schmitt alerted us to in his 
Concept of the Political?  If being of the liberal left involves embracing the values that 
mobilised the Euro-American revolutions of the 18th century, and the anti-colonial struggles 
for self-determination, then what is the liberal stance on a unilateral superpower such as 
the U.S overthrowing the Taliban in Afghanistan or a tyrannical dictator in Iraq?  This kind 
of question is a symptom of a wider political crisis in Europe and North America.  With no 
emancipatory project of transformation, the ‘superpower citizen’ is reduced to being a 
spectator whose ‘determination’ is praised because the Stock Market was steady as the 
bombing commenced.17  
Nick Cohen’s What’s Left? How Liberals Lost Their Way is one example of the 
tendency to adopt a muscular approach to liberalism in order to legitimate wars for 
democracy.  Cohen argues that the left have abandoned their liberal democratic principles 
in the face of a tyrannical dictator because they could not stomach US unilateralism, 
Bush’s pushing of the boundaries on what constitutes torture, Guantánamo Bay, and the 
privatization of Iraq’s oil industry.18  Led astray by postmodernist relativists, liberals, 
according to Cohen, were unable to take the “only moral option” of “supporting Iraqis as 
they struggled to establish democracy”.19 The war had a “degree of legitimacy” that liberals 
should have readily accepted because it involved the “overthrow of Saddam Hussein”.20  
This argument appears to be saying, ‘work out who your friends and enemies are’, and 
then stand with your friends.  You can criticise what is done in your name, but do not shy 
away from recognising that a tyrannical dictator has been overthrown.  That seems to be a 
                                                 
17
 See Sheldon S. Wolin, “Brave New World” 5: 4 Theory and Event (2002). 
18
 Cohen, What’s Left? Ch. 11. 
19
 Cohen, What’s Left?, p. 314. 
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quintessentially liberal problem – but one that Schmitt recognised far more rigorously than 
Cohen, and he was no liberal. 
The 20th Century provides the liberal left with its archetypal adversaries – fascist 
and communist totalitarianism.  Indeed, despite the claim that the difference is self-
evident, much ink is spilt on distinguishing the excesses of democracy from totalitarianism.  
The foundational purchase of totalitarianism for the liberal left cannot be underplayed. Nazi 
Germany and Soviet communists are the twin ‘evils’ readily wheeled out in order to 
distinguish the ‘limit-conditions’ of modern western liberal democracies from those 
erstwhile ideological foes.  The recent excesses of liberal democratic orders are now 
numerous and familiar: draconian anti-terror measures, Guantánamo Bay, Belmarsh 
Prison, detention camps in Port Headland and Woomera, Australia, atrocities in Abu 
Ghraib and elsewhere in Iraq, and the ongoing legacies of colonial dispossession and 
enrichment.  Whatever its deficiencies, the liberal left tell us, the liberal state is not 
totalitarian.  Democracy and the rule of law are now universally embraced modes of 
governing, they claim – despite the horrors committed in the name of liberal state-building 
and modern progress, including those authorised by domestic and international law.  
 Liberalism’s new adversary, we are told, is Islamic or Muslim fundamentalism – a 
new totalitarian formation. According to the liberal left, no insurgency in contemporary Iraq 
or Afghanistan could be a resistance to outside rule.  When the ‘home of democracy’ 
comes calling to lend a helping hand, nothing short of a twisted desire for totalitarian 
absolutism, or jihadi cultism, could motivate acts of resistance. Any attempt to explain that 
tyrannical abuses of power are not particular to a non-western people, religion, or ‘culture’ 
– by suggesting, for instance, that the USA, UK, France and the former USSR played 
some significant part in installing, arming, and sustaining dictators such as Saddam 
Hussein or Augusto Pinochet tends to be dismissed as an apology for tyranny and 
totalitarianism. To object to high altitude aerial bombing as a means of emancipating 
Afghan women is to attract the charge that the universal equality of women is being 
disregarded in the name of ‘cultural relativism’.  ‘Wife burning’ and ‘female genital 
mutilation’ are other favourite calling cards of muscular liberals (a repeat of the bygone 
obsession with the ‘sex practices of the natives’).  These are the ‘signs’ of barbarism – and 
a ‘people’ and ‘culture’, no less, are indicted on mass for sustaining these practices.  The 
multitude of different forms of ‘veiling’ among Muslim women is another ‘frontline’ for 
muscular liberals.  To explain that religious piety, or a complex range of negotiations 
among men/women, parents/children, within and between communities, is at stake is to 
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attract the charge of ‘epistemological relativism’.21  The panacea for all these different 
vectors of political and cultural conflict, we are asked to believe, is universal truth, 
rationality and science, all mediated through democratic institutions and human rights 
sourced in an indefinite place called the ‘West’.  
The relationship between death, politics, and subjectivity appear central to many 
discussions which compare violence in the name of liberal democratic political formations 
with those apparently driven by Islam. It thus seems apt to interrogate how liberal 
subjectivity, human finitude, and politics cohere at the site of ‘collective immortality’22 (a 
notion of the public, nation, or political community).  In the following section, then, I focus 
on the death-politics nexus in some influential studies.23   
 
II Death and Politics  
Berman draws a “universal mission” for the United States from Abraham Lincoln’s 
Gettysburg Address – and places emphasis on the defence of freedom as a work of death. 
According to Berman, Lincoln did not “avert his eyes from death”.24  For Lincoln, reflecting 
on the sacrifice of Union soldiers during the Civil War, death is the measure of 
commitment to liberty, equality, and self-government: “the last full measure of devotion”.25 
The cultish register is at a fevered pitch as Berman, inspired by Lincoln, draws the nexus 
between liberalism and war: “a liberal society must be, when challenged, a warlike society, 
or it will not endure”.26  Much horror and suffering has been unleashed on the world in the 
name of the liberal society which must endure.  ‘Moral equivalence’ is the fuzzy concept 
deployed if the difference between our ‘good war’ and their senseless cult of death is 
questioned. It is the thanatopolitical formations common to liberalism and Islamism that 
this section will explore. 
                                                 
21
 See my discussion of the various approaches to subjectivity and subjection in the context of legal 
limits on ‘veiling’, and the unstable distinction between religion and secularism, in S. Motha, “Veiled 
Women and the affect of Religion in Democracy”, in S. Motha (ed.), Democracy’s Empire: 
Sovereignty, Law, and Violence (Oxford, Blackwell, 2007), pp. 139-62. 
22
 Asad, Suicide Bombing, p. 96. 
23
 I have elected to focus here on liberalism, terrorism, and the death-politics nexus.  An equally 
important trajectory, but one that is beyond the scope of this essay, is the manner in which 
secularism is ‘civilising and disciplinary’ rather than directly opposed to religion.  This argument is 
developed by Saba Mahmood who examines the “shared approach to scriptural hermeneutics” in 
the current religiosity of the US Government and ‘liberal Muslims’ who together are attempting to 
refashion an Islamic reformation. This analysis goes a long way towards breaking down the 
opposition between secularism and religion: see Saba Mahmood, “Secularism, Hermeneutics, and 
Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation” (2006) 18:2 Public Culture 323-347 at 329-30. 
24
 Berman, Terror and Liberalism, p. 170. 
25
 Berman, Terror and Liberalism, p. 170. 
26
 Berman, Terror and Liberalism, p. 170. 
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One does not need to go to great lengths to demonstrate the close links between 
the preservation of a liberal political order and a politics of death.  At its most extreme, the 
International Court of Justice found that the use of nuclear weapons is potentially lawful. 
There is no ‘universal prohibition’ of the use of nuclear weapons in international law if the 
life of a state is threatened.27 Moreover, violence in the name of liberal democracy has 
been widespread and has served to terrorise civilian populations: recall the numerous 
genocidal wars of colonial conquest, the bombing of German and Japanese civilians 
during WWII, or the use of nuclear armaments against the Japanese in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki.  The pornography of killing and the ‘erotic involvement with death’ has been 
well documented by psychiatrists working with Vietnam veterans suffering post-traumatic 
stress disorders – and doubtless many more of these accounts will emerge out of the 
current occupation of Iraq.  Talal Asad discusses these accounts of killing and violence in 
the context of exploring the horror associated with different modes of violence and death, 
including suicide bombing.28 As Asad points out, the violence of the warriors of the secular 
modern state is not dissected in the same way as the suicide bomber.   Asad suggests 
that many of the discussions about suicide bombing reveal much more about liberal 
assumptions about religious subjectivity and political violence than what is ostensibly 
being explained. Below I explore how the ideologies that inform suicide bombing have far 
more in common with liberal imaginings of human subjectivity than with the pre-liberal, 
‘traditional’, cultish throwback now being associated with Islam and denounced by the 
liberal left.  
For the liberal left war has become a legitimate means of bringing about political 
transformation. Even after the post-invasion catastrophe in Iraq, Berman and others have 
argued that the invasion and occupation should be recognised as “anti-totalitarian 
revolutions”, the Baathists having contributed to the “atmosphere” that led to 9/11.29  The 
hundreds of thousands of dead civilians are then part of a revolutionary shift to defeat a 
totalitarian dictator and establish democracy, the rule of law and equality for women.  The 
means/end relationship between violence/death and political goals is explicit.  No such 
instrumentalization of death for political and temporal ends is extended to suicide 
bombers.  Even in accounts that are relatively “sympathetic” to the political conditions 
(though not the means) that produce death and killing by suicide bombing, suicide is often 
                                                 
27
 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (8th July, 1996) 
(International Court of Justice), I.C.J. Reports 1996, 226.  
28
 Asad, Suicide Bombing, pp. 71-2. See the discussion there of Theodore Nadelson, Trained to 
Kill: Soldiers at War (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). 
29
 Paul Berman, “Will the Opposition Lead?” New York Times, April 15, 2004 - available at 
http://query.nytimes.com, last accessed on 28 February, 2008. 
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treated as the ‘end’ rather than the means of violence. Let us turn to consider some such 
accounts.  
One approach is to understand death and sacrifice in the register of oppression 
and freedom.  In his much discussed essay, “Necropolitics”, Archille Mbembe treats 
suicide bombing in the context of a discussion about the centrality of death in modern 
calculations of power.30 He compares and contrasts a range of necropolitical instances 
such as the Holocaust of European Jews, slavery, colonialism, and apartheid South Africa. 
Israel/Palestine, a contemporary formation where death, terror, and freedom are in co-
circulation, is framed by Mbembe through two logics – the ‘logic of survival’ and the ‘logic 
of martyrdom’.  In Hegelian terms the ‘survivor’ is a being whose existence is 
characterised entirely as a victory over the other, his enemy.31  The suicide bomber does 
not conform to this logic as he does not survive the violent attack to gloat over his dead 
victim. 
How does martyrdom fit in a paradigm of oppression and freedom? Mbembe 
explains martyrdom only by distinguishing it from the sacrificial deaths of a state’s 
uniformed regulars. The inscription of this difference says a great deal about how the 
political theorist has normalised state violence and terror.  Why is the death of the soldier 
also not an act of martyrdom? According to Mbembe what separates the suicide bomber 
from the state’s various killing machines is the form – indeed, the uniform of the killer.  
This, along with the ‘justness’ of war, legally authorises the state to deal out death.  The 
logic of martyrdom, Mbembe says, needs to confront this distinction between form 
(uniformed regular or terrorist) and matter (the dealing out of death).  But for Mbembe, 
martyrdom collapses form/matter as the suicide bomber’s body becomes the uniform of 
the destructive device – the body is the weapon, and is thus removed from a field of 
power. This is tantamount to the denial of a political-death that has a temporal purchase.  
Commenting on the body of the suicide bomber, Mbembe says: 
The body in itself has neither power nor value. The power and value of the body result from 
a process of abstraction based on the desire for eternity. In that sense, the martyr, having 
established a moment of supremacy in which the subject overcomes his own mortality, can 
be seen as labouring under the sign of the future. In other words, in death the future is 
collapsed into the present.32 
This is a common reduction of the suicide bomber to one who seeks another-worldly 
immortality – an account I will return to below.  On this account, the materiality of the 
present is overcome through a mystical association with a transcendental future.  The 
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motivation for pain, suffering, planning and implementing one’s own violent death and that 
of others, is given an otherworldly (and largely theological) explanation.  ‘Desire for 
eternity’ is offered as the explanation for why the body is turned into a malleable thing:  
The matter of the body, or again the matter which is the body, is invested with properties 
that cannot be deduced from its character as a thing, but from a transcendental nomos 
outside it. The besieged body becomes a piece of metal whose function is, through 
sacrifice, to bring eternal life into being. The body duplicates itself and, in death, literally 
and metaphorically escapes the state of siege and occupation.33 
Death, suicide, the site of self-negation is also, then, a space of a freedom to come.  It is 
an escape from the pain of occupation or other forms of suffering.  Death mediates the 
journey to another world of redemption. The ‘body in pain’ is quite central to Mbembe’s 
account of terror, death, and freedom. While this account may offer some insights into 
Palestinian suicide bombers in the context of occupation, it adopts the view that the logic 
of suicide bombing can be derived from some ‘authentic’ sense of the possibility of 
being/existence beyond worldly life. The political, temporal implications of this death are 
not theorised.  If death is politics, it is as a politically unassimilable road to another form of 
being.  
Are there other ways in which the ‘body in pain’ can be placed in relation with a 
community or political formation? Why abstract the body out of its setting through the 
ideas and ideologies deployed to recruit, plan, and execute violent acts? The suicide 
bomber is then, despite the attention to the conditions of her suffering, removed from 
being in a political and historical relationship with her victim.  And what are the implications 
of recognising release from pain through self-sacrifice as a political strategy or technique 
of resistance? We can explore the implications and limits of Mbembe’s approach by 
considering other accounts which study the ‘worldly’ and ‘other worldly’ dimensions of 
martyrdom and sacrifice. 
 Another influential approach views suicide bombing as motivated by religion. This 
approach seeks a sociological and theological explanation beyond the individual 
psychological one.  The Christian sense of sacrifice is adopted to understand suicide 
bombing as the making-holy or becoming ‘sacred’ of the sacrificiant. Asad argues that this 
involves taking the Christian “concept of Christ’s supreme gift of himself as the model for 
sacrifice in general”.34  Suicide bombing or martyrdom is then seen as a sacrificial gift 
made to the ‘Palestinian nation’, for instance, without interrogating the kind of religious 
subjectivity that is invoked here. The act becomes at once social, motivated by religion, 
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and constitutive of a relation between violence, nation, and religion. The nuanced 
hermeneutic differences between appellations such as ‘sacrifice, gift, martyrdom’ tend to 
be ignored by commentators that want the narrative to be an assimilation of the act of the 
suicide bomber to the regular ‘national’ narratives such as the way in which we saw 
Berman invoke Lincoln above.   
As Asad points out, the Arabic word for ‘gift’, hadiyya, is never used to describe 
sacrifice, and qurbān, the Arabic word for sacrifice is more commonly used by Arabic 
speaking Christians to describe communion, than by Arabic speaking Muslims to describe 
animal sacrifice.35 The reason the religious motivation of suicide bombing is favoured, as 
Asad explains, is that it combines a psychological element familiar to a criminal process, 
and a “cultural sign” that can distinguish ‘them’ from ‘us’. This feeds the civilizational 
discourse where ‘we’ are committed to life, and ‘they’ are committed to death.36 The 
suicide bomber is then, at once, the ‘same’ and thus cognisable (possessing the ‘last full 
measure of devotion’) and absolutely different (pre-modern, unquestioning, not doubting 
religion).  A key difference here is the purchase of the comparison between the secular 
ends of liberal democracy with the violence, sacrifice, or martyrdom of Islamist terrorists. It 
is to the undoing of that difference that I will now turn. 
 To put the issue bluntly, what do jihādis have in common with those who commit 
violence in the name of liberal democracy?  To explore this question recall the opposition 
posed by left liberals between Islamic fundamentalism as a revival of pre-modern tribalism 
and stasis in contrast to western wars for democracy which stand for enlightenment 
values, rationality and freedom.  Recall, also, the absence of ‘moral equivalence’ between 
‘our good war’ and ‘their cult of death’.  According to Roxanne Euben jihad has a rich and 
varied set of meanings in Islam: “Derived from the verb jahada which means "to exert," "to 
struggle," or "to strive", jihad literally means "exerting one's utmost power, efforts, 
endeavours, or ability in contending with an object of disapprobation" or striving toward a 
worthy goal.37 As Euben explains “When qualified by the phrase "in the path of God” (fi 
Sabil Allah), jihad refers to struggling or striving in the path of God, yet the form and 
means of such struggle are quite varied in the Islamic sources”.38 Euben then makes two 
important arguments that help to dissolve the opposition between jihādis and deathly 
democrats.  First, the contemporary and largely postcolonial reworking of jihad must not 
be seen as the revival of an unadulterated Islamic tradition.  When Islamist writers like 
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Qutb insist on the revival of a ‘tradition’, they engage in a modern discourse of authenticity, 
as well as sovereignty, socialism, nationality, and rationality in order to advance their 
arguments in a terrain of contestation in which no ‘pure’ position is available.39 This is not 
unlike the ‘last full measure of devotion’ in the sacrifice of soldiers in the name of liberty, 
nation, or democracy.  Second, the assertion of a universalist and social logic is the better 
interpretation of contemporary theorists of jihad, rather than the reading of radical Islam as 
a ‘particularism’ to be contrasted to the ‘universalist’ West (modern, enlightened and so 
on).  As Euben points out: “action in the name of jihad has always been, at least since the 
Medinan period, in the service of a universalist and universalizing political and social 
order”.40  While this is not a justification of killings in the name of jihad, it displaces the 
sense that suicide bombing is a return to ‘primitive tradition’ or the pursuit of an ‘other 
worldly’ immortality. What is clear from this discussion are the continuities rather than 
differences between Islamic and so-called Western discourses in relation to death and 
politics.  Only the western universal, refusing to recognize Islam as an alternative 
universal, renders it into an otherworldly quest.  
It is unhelpful to orient the discussion of death and politics through apparent 
differences between west/east, Islamic and Christian legacies, or pre-modern and modern 
social and political imaginings. Euben insists that the relationship between death and 
worldly politics is an intimate one, and it is not only the preserve of Islamists who are read 
as revivers of ‘pre-modern’ tribalism.  Christianity produces its own legion of deadly saints.  
Consider the following incisive passage from Walzer, discussed by Euben:  
The puritan response produced revolutionaries, that is, saints, godly magistrates, men 
already disciplined (before the revolution begins) for the strenuous work of transforming all 
society and all men in the image of their own salvation. Such men, narrow, fanatical, 
enthusiastic, committed to their "work," have little to contribute to the development of either 
liberalism or capitalism ... . Their great achievement is what is known in the sociology of 
revolution as the terror, the effort to create a Holy Commonwealth and to force men to be 
Godly. ...Their extraordinary self-confidence ... makes them capable finally of killing the 
king. ..the saints are entrepreneurs indeed, but in politics rather than in economics. They 
ruthlessly (and anxiously) pursue not wealth or even individual power. . . but collective 
control of themselves, of each other, of all England.41 
Death, terror, and politics are a worldly pursuit of power and control.  The unification of a 
polity under One law, the governance of a territory under One authority, the ‘affective 
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binding’ of the human body to the text of the law, are as common to Christianity as they 
are to Islam.42   
Without wishing to underestimate the differences between Christianity and Islam, 
Marinos Diamantides has explained how they both share a common reception of Greek 
texts, similar roles for scholars who engage in scriptural interpretation – and above all a 
tendency towards legalism. 43  It is then a common ‘dogmatism’ rather than an insuperable 
difference that marks their conflicts.  Diamantides explains how ‘law’ becomes the primary 
expression of Islam “in a manner structurally similar to Christianity”.44  In Islam there is an 
attempt at Canonization – but one that ultimately fails, or at least fails to manifest itself in 
the form of Papal or other sovereign form which transcends local, communal, consensual 
interpretations of texts.  What then accounts for the dis/similarities between Islam and 
Christianity?  At the heart of this, for Diamantides, is the divergent fate of legalism in Islam 
and Christianity – the reception of Roman Canon law is “still born” in Islam, whereas 
Christianity successfully establishes “exclusive interpretative authority” at the centre of an 
imperial capital.45  Christianity evolves into the figure of what in later modernity becomes a 
‘sovereign authority’, along with a form of subjectivization which involves “‘autonomy’, 
‘solidarity’, ‘reciprocity’”.46  Later this matures into a principle whereby the ‘truth-seeking’ 
autonomous individual subject is at the heart of ‘Western political rationality’.47  In Islam, in 
contrast, the equivalent principle is the “local community as ‘collective subject’” speaking 
through multiple, “revered interpreters of religious law”.48 These similarities and contingent 
differences result in anxieties that are related to the secularization of both monotheisms.  
Current Islamic politics should then be viewed, Diamantides argues, as a “secular politics 
with a religious cloak” – just as “western liberalism is a secular cloak for religious 
politics”.49  While the potential symmetry of this formulation requires further elaboration 
beyond the scope of this essay, it does undo the claim that the West is the only source of 
a secular and worldly politics.  The repression of the religious as the condition of modern 
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politics reveals itself to be an unfinished enterprise threatened by the eternal return of 
religion. 
 What is primarily at stake, at least for my purposes, in this ‘Western-Islamic 
Conception of Legalism’ as Diamantides has explained it is the displacement of the very 
conception of the ‘West’ as distinct from ‘Islamic tradition’.  As Jean-Luc Nancy has 
cogently expressed it: “The West can no longer call itself the West from the moment it 
witnesses the spread, across the entire world, of the form that could once have seemed to 
constitute its distinguishing features”.50 The full implications of this claim for an 
interrogation of globalization, and indeed the ‘global war on terror’ is beyond the 
immediate scope of this essay.  But what it directs us to is the urgent need to contest and 
question categories such as the ‘West’, or indeed ‘Europe’ – two signs of apparent 
presence, or finitude, which are not now, if they ever were, capable of being given any 
consistent substance.  And yet so much is loaded on to the ‘West’/’Europe’ and its reason, 
enlightenment, humanity, autonomy, secularism and so on.  These are treated as if they 
are a continuous progression from the one source, now contained within the one place 
(the West), and attacked by a unified tribe of barbarians amassed against it.  Diamantides 
explains why this dis/continuous trajectory of the West is not just Western-Christian, but 
also Western-Islamic. And Nancy explains how the ‘West’ is neither a place nor a 
destination as the West itself has become globalised through processes of colonialism and 
the spread of a techno-scientific rationality.  
 
III  Concluding Remarks: No Place Like the ‘West’  
The events of September 11, 2001 start with a collision that is the symbol and 
symptom of a clash of monotheisms.51  There was a correspondence between all that is 
symbolised through the ‘World Trade Centre’, God as the dollar, or in fact the God 
mentioned in the dollar, and Islamist terrorists who sort a worldly immortality in the name 
of another monotheistic God.52  In either case an instrumentalised God is presented as a 
source of absolute value.  The reaction that took the name ‘war on terror’ became the site 
for a liberal deployment of yet more absolutes – civilizational divisions, secular pretentions, 
and extraordinary renditions. But this post 9/11 world, as it has come to be called, seems 
to reiterate a formulation that no longer seems possible precisely because the world has 
become global.  Is there not a ‘third world’ in the ‘first’, or elements in the global south that 
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can be the author of their own destruction?  Secularism, rationality, science, democracy, 
poverty, raced and gendered oppressions – none of these phenomena can be sourced in 
the West given their global proliferation.  To that extent the new alignments of the liberal 
left with which I began this discussion are out of time, and out of place in this new global 
world.  If I may lower the tone for a moment to remind ourselves, consider the following 
conception of religion in the world from Martin Amis:   
Today, in the West, there are no good excuses for religious belief - unless we think 
ignorance, reaction and sentimentality are good excuses. This is of course not so in the 
East, where, we acknowledge, almost every living citizen in many huge and populous 
countries is intimately defined by religious belief.53   
This claim is patently absurd when considered in relation to the United States.  And no one 
passed this news on to the British Government which steadfastly retains a far from secular 
constitutional order in the UK.  For instance, a recent White Paper on constitutional reform 
had this to say about the centrality of the Church of England: “The Church of England is by 
law established as the Church in England and the Monarch is its Supreme Governor. The 
Government remains committed to this position”.54  Our time, then, is out of joint. At once 
secular in outlook, but committed to Christian institutions, political and juridical formations 
throughout the so called ‘West’ reproduce the structures and formations of monotheism.  
‘Clash of civilization’ discourses are obsessed with the ‘West’ as the sign that 
delivers all meaning and value.  The message is that the West has resolved the problem 
of authority through liberal constitutionalism. The liberal left project their stance on the war 
as the epitome of rationality, opposed to the myth and traditional stasis of the East.  But 
this rationalism has produced the most vociferous support for deadly and destructive 
violence unleashed by the one remaining superpower and its allies.  Is this affective 
response to terrorism as far from rationalism that one can imagine – or, indeed, is it a 
symptom of rationality’s loss of value?55 There is a global crisis of ‘value’ – as Nancy has 
put it.56 The liberal left response to this should have involved an urgent rethinking of the 
substitutes for transcendent value, national sovereignty, for instance, which has been such 
a corrupting ground for internationalism. Ethno-national community as the basis for 
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sovereign self-determination is another problem that required urgent attention.  Instead the 
most fervent secular hopes have been deployed in the service of aggressive calls for war 
and destructive violence.  What does this tell us about the monotheistic inheritance of 
secular formations? 
Imagining the world as a ‘secularization’ of the Christian ‘created world’, or ‘fallen 
world’ is no longer adequate.  The identification of an immanent principle or end – that is, a 
cause or telos for this world from this world - has been the site of many disasters. The 
question of the ‘world’ was mainly approached as a question of ‘value’ – that is, whether 
God, humanity, property, labour, nation will be the source of value.  The modern problem 
has been to cope with the dissipation of an available source of sense outside the world – 
to explain the immanent sense of the world.   Whether this was to be from humanity, the 
use or exchange value of labour, the political theologies of ‘blood and soil’, nation or 
people, have been symptomatic of the struggle for sense. What Nancy has suggested is 
that the problem of ‘world’ must now be confronted beyond the traditions of monotheism, 
including secularised onto-theological forms.  As value becomes immanent to the world, 
the ‘creation’ of the world is displaced into the “without-reason” of the world: “and this 
displacement is not a transposition, a ‘secularization’ of the onto-theological or 
metaphysical-Christian scheme: it is, rather, its deconstruction and emptying out, and it 
opens onto another space – of place and of risk – which we have just begun to enter”.57  
Permit me to explain this further – though only as a preliminary opening to future 
engagements and elaborations.  
 Recourse to the ‘West’, ‘Europe’, ‘enlightenment values’, without further exploration 
of their discontinuous trajectories reveals that there is a break-down of meaning – an 
inability to make sense of contemporary events other than by reaching for an old ‘certainty’ 
that was never present to itself.  Nancy has explained that this breakdown of meaning 
must be understood within the tradition of ‘monotheism’ itself.  Monotheism is anti-religious 
– and that fate haunts all peoples drawing their traditions from the three Religions of the 
Book. What is meant by ‘monotheism is anti-religious’?  At stake in the ‘mono-’ of 
monotheism is not only a distinction with ‘polytheism’, but also the potential abandonment 
that might by wrought by a jealous God whose ‘people’ cannot be certain of their fate.  
There is no guarantee that through means of sacrifice, or by calling on ‘Him’ to be good to 
‘His people’, that this all powerful God will bestow goodwill.  As Nancy explains:  
Monotheism, in its first principles, undoes theism, that is to say the presence of a power 
that assembles the world and guarantees its meaning. It thus makes the name of ‘god’ 
absolutely problematic — it makes it nonsignificant — and above all it takes away from it all 
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power to guarantee. The Christian guarantee can only take place at the price of a category 
that is completely opposed to that of religious belief: the category of ‘faith’, which is loyalty 
to an absence and the certainty of this loyalty in the absence of any guarantee”.58  
The absence of a power that can guarantee meaning – that is our present condition. But 
this absence also marks the auto-deconstructive potential of monotheism.  In this 
condition, Man is placed at the centre of deciphering the meaning of the essence of God – 
that is, monotheism becomes demythologised, and thus less religious.  Christianity in 
particular becomes auto-interpretative: “a symbolic order deciphered in the human 
condition (man’s reason, his freedom, his dignity, his relations with others …)”.59 Religious 
markers of sacredness are effaced “in favour of what Kant called a ‘religion within the 
limits of plain reason’, or again what Feuerbach articulated in saying that ‘the belief in God 
is man’s belief in the infinity and the truth of his own essence’”.60  Recourse to the ‘West’, 
rationality, ‘enlightenment values’ are only various supplements to this absolute loneliness 
of being without a power that will guarantee meaning – of being so utterly free.  The liberal 
left have run aground in the face of this immense task, clinging as they have to mundane 
and ill-thought distinctions between our good wars and their bad meaningless deaths.  
What Nancy helps us to see is the “dark side” of monotheism now showing itself in the 
rationalist liberal left. Despite all the efforts to establish an absolute divide between the 
West and the rest, between Christianity (its secularism) and Islam, the liberal left (and all 
liberals and Christians) are facing the same dilemmas as radical Muslims.  A loss of a 
transcendent and determinant source of authority is producing and anxious and violent 
response.  The urgent question now is whether a thought apt for the challenges of this 
time can be attended to in the work that is currently under way to reground and re-launch 
a universal among many political philosophers of the left.61  The monotheistic attachments 
of such discourses carry many dangers. But exploring and critically interrogating them is 
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